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A 

TO THE 

Con0rc££ of tfie lltmtto &tate& 

ON THE 

SUBJECT OF RESTRAINING 

THE 

INCREASE OF SLAVERY 

IN 

NEW STATES 

TO BE 

ADMITTED INTO THE UNION. 

PREPARED 

IN PURSUANCE OF A VOTE OF THE INHABITANTS OF BOSTON 

AND ITS VICINITY, ASSEMBLED AT THE STATE HOUSK, 

ON THE THIRD OF DECEMBER, A. D. 1819. 



s 


BOSTON 


: 


SEWELL 


PHELPS, 


PRINTER. 


No. 


5, Court Street. 




1819. 





£- 



THE Committee appointed by a vote of the Meeting holden in the 
State House on the 3d instant, to prepare a Memorial to Congress, on 
the subject of the Prohibition of Slavery in the New States, submit the 
following. 

DANIEL WEBSTER, 
GEORGE BLAKE, 
JOSIAH QUINCY, 
JAMES T. AUSTIN, 
JOHN GALLISON, 
Boston, December 15, 1819. 



MEMORIAL- 



To the Senate and tioilse of Representatives of the United States, 
in Congress Assembled. 

THE undersigned, inhabitants of Boston and its vicinity, 
beg leave most respectfully and humbly to represent ; That 
the question of the introduction of Slavery into the New 
States, to be formed on the west side of the Mississippi River, 
appears to them to be a question of the last importance to the 
future welfare of the United States. If the progress of this 
great evil is ever to be arrested, it seems to the undersigned 
that this is the time to arrest it, A false step taken now can- 
not be retraced ; and it appears to us that the happiness of 
unborn millions rests on the measures, which Congress may, 
on this occasion, adopt. Considering this as no local ques- 
tion, nor a question to be decided by a temporary expedien- 
cy, but as involving great interests of the whole of the United 
States, and affecting deeply and essentially those objects of 
common defence, general welfare, and the perpetuation of 
the blessings of liberty, for which the Constitution itself was 
formed, we have presumed, in this way, to offer our senti- 
ments and express our wishes to the National Legislature. 
And as various reasons have been suggested, against prohibit- 
ing Slavery in the New States, it may perhaps be permitted 
to us to state our reasons, both for believing that Congress 
possesses the Constitutional power to make such prohibition 



a condition, on the admission of a New Stale into the Union, 
and that it is just and proper that they should exercise that 
power. 

And, in the first place, as to the Constitutional authority of 
Congress. — The Constitution of the United States has declar- 
ed, that " the Congress shall have power to dispose of and 
" make all needful rules and regulations respecting the Terri- 
" tory, or other property belonging to the United States ; and 
" nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to preju- 
" dice the claims of the United States, or of any particular 
" State." It is very well known that the saving in this clause 
of the claims of any particular State was designed to apply 
to claims by the then existing States of territory, which was 
also claimed by the United States as their own property. It 
has, therefore, no bearing on the present question. The pow- 
er, then, of Congress over its own territories is, by the very 
terms of the Constitution, unlimited. It may make all " need- 
" ful rules and regulations ;" which of course include all such 
regulations as its own views of policy or expediency shall 
from time to time dictate. If, therefore, in its judgment, it be 
needful for the benefit of a Territory to enact a prohibition of 
Slavery, it would seem to be as much within its power of legis- 
lation, as any other ordinary act of local policy. Its sove- 
reignty being complete and universal, as to the Territory, it 
may exercise over it the most ample jurisdiction in every 
respect. It possesses in this view all the authority, which any 
State Legislature possesses over its own Territory ; and if a 
State Legislature may, in its discretion, abolish or prohibit 
Slavery within its own limits, in virtue of its general legisla- 
tive authority, for the same reason Congress also may exer- 
cise the like authority over its own Territories. And that a 
State Legislature, unless restrained by some constitutional 
provision, may so do, is unquestionable, and has been estab- 
lished by general practice. 

If, then, Congress possess unlimited powers of government 
over its Territories, it may certainly from time to time vary, 



control and modify its legislation as it pleases. The Territo- 
ries, as such, can have no rights but such as are conferred by 
Congress ; and it is morally bound to adopt such measures as 
are best calculated to promote the permanent interests and 
security of these Territories, as well as to secure the future 
well being of the Union. Without an enabling act of Con- 
gress, no Territory or portion of Territory belonging to the 
United States can be created into a State, or form a constitu- 
tion of government, or become discharged of its Territorial 
obedience ; and if Congress may grant to any of its Territories 
this privilege, it may also most clearly, as it seems to us, in 
its discretion, refuse it. It is not obliged to admit it to become 
a State, if it be not satisfied that such admission will conduce 
as well to its own good as to the good of the Union. In this 
respect Congress stands, in relation to its Territories, like a 
State in relation to any portion of its own Territory, which 
requests to be separated and formed into a New State. No 
person has ever doubted that the question as to such separa- 
tion was a question of expediency, resting in the sound dis- 
cretion of the State ; and that it could not be claimed as 
matter of right, unless in virtue of some compact, establishing 
such right. No person has ever doubted that any State, in 
acceding to a division of its Territory, and the formation of a 
New State, has always possessed the right to impose its own 
terms and conditions as a part of the grant. The ground of 
this right is the exclusive possession of sovereignty, with 
which the State is not compellable to part, and if it does part 
with it, it may annex all such conditions and rules as it deems 
fit for its own security and for the permanent good of the citi- 
zens of the divided Territory. Such was the case of Virginia, 
when she acceded to the separation of the District of Ken- 
tucky, and allowed it to become an independent State. Such 
is the case of the recent separation of the District of Maine 
from Massachusetts. In each of these cases, a considerable 
number of fundamental conditions were offered to the Districts 
as the sole grounds, upon which the separation could be al- 



lowed ; and not a doubt was ever entertained, that these con- 
ditions were within the legitimate exercise and authority of 
these States. These conditions were accepted by Kentucky, 
and have been accepted by Maine; and it was never imagin- 
ed, that they in any respect prevented either from possessing 
all the proper attributes of State sovereignty. They have 
never been viewed in any other light than as just restrictions, 
not upon essential State rights, but upon an unlimited exercise 
of sovereignty, which might be injurious to rights already 
vested in the parent State, or its citizens. And if Virginia 
and Massachusetts may, by virtue of their sovereign rights, 
impose conditions upon their grants of their own Territorial 
jurisdiction; for the same reason, it would seem, the United 
States may impose any like conditions, according to their own 
sound discretion. And a construction of this clause of the 
Constitution of the United States, which should inhibit Con- 
gress from annexing conditions to the act enabling any Terri- 
tory to form a State government, because it would impair the 
sovereignty of the State so formed, would equally affect the 
like conditions annexed by a State to a like act in favour of 
a portion of its own Territory. A construction, which would 
lead to such consequences, cannot be a sound one. It would 
lead to the most injurious results, and absolve all the New 
States, which have been admitted into the Union since the year 
1 791, from conditions, which have hitherto been held to be in- 
violably bini ling ii j ion them. It would also be repugnant to the 
comprehensive language of this clause of the Constitution, and 
to the uniform practice, which has prevailed under it from the 
earliest period of the formation of New States to the present 
time. No State has ever admitted a New State to be formed 
in its own bosom without annexing conditions, and no act has 
ed Congress enabling any of its Territories to become 
States, which has not, in like manner, annexed important fun- 
damental conditions to the act. And if conditions may be 
annexed, it depends solely upon the wisdom of Congress what 
such conditions shall be. They may embrace every thing 



not incompatible with the possession of those federal rights, 
which an admission into the Union confers upon the New 
State. As to such rights, there must, by the very nature of 
the case, be an implied exception. The remarks, that have 
hitherto been made, have proceeded upon the supposition that 
Congress are not morally bound, cither by the Treaty of 
Cession, or by any compact with the inhabitants, to pass an 
act for the erection of the New State, without imposing condi- 
tions. 

These observations, so far, have been confined to the Con- 
stitutional authority of Congress flowing directly from the 
clause which has been mentioned. Here then is the case of an 
express power given in plain terms ; and by another clause of 
the Constitution, Congress have express authority " to make 
" all laws necessary and proper for carrying that power into 
" execution." But other clauses may well be called in aid of 
this construction, applicable to all cases whatsoever in which 
a New State seeks to be admitted into the Union. The Con- 
stitution provides that " New States may be admitted into the 
" Union." The only parties to the Constitution, contemplated 
by it originally, were the thirteen confederated States. It was 
perceived that the Territory, already included within these 
States, might be beneficially divided and organized under sepa- 
rate governments, and that the Territories already belonging 
to the United States might, and in good faith ought, to partici- 
pate in the privileges of the federal Union. It was therefore 
wisely provided that Congress, in which all the Old States were 
represented, should have authority to admit New States into 
the Union, whenever in its judgment such an act would be ben- 
eficial to the public interests. But it was at the same time pro- 
vided that no New State should be formed or erected within 
the jurisdiction of any other State, &c. without the consent of 
the Legislatures of the States concerned, as well as of the Con- 
gress. It is observable, that the language of the Constitution 
is, that New States may (not shall) be admitted into the Union. 
Jt is therefore a privilege which Congi ess may withhold or 



8 

grant, according to its discretion. If it may give its consent, it 
may also refuse it, and no New State can have a right to compel 
Congress to do that, which in its judgment is not fit to be done. 
If Congress have authority to withhold its consent, it has also 
authority to give that consent either absolutely, or upon con- 
dition; for there is nothing in the Constitution which restricts 
the manner or the terms of that consent. It is observable, too, 
that where a New State is to be erected within the limits of an 
Old State, the consent of the State Legislature is as necessary 
as that of Congress. Now it will not, we suppose, be contend- 
ed, that the Slate Legislature may not grant its consent upon 
condition ; and if so, Congress must have the same right also, 
for the consent of the State Legislatures and of Congress is 
required by the same clause, and the construction which fixes 
the meaning of " consent" as to the one, must, in order to 
maintain consistency, fix it as to the other. And here it might 
be again asked, if the conditions of Virginia, annexed to her 
consent that Kentucky should become a State, were not bind- 
ing upon the latter, and upon Congress ? It appears to the 
memorialists perfectly clear, that since Congress has a discre- 
tional authority as to the admission of New States into the 
Union, it may impose whatever conditions it pleases as terms 
of that consent ; and that this clause, alone, which applies as 
well to New States formed from Old States, as to those formed 
from the Territories of the Union, completely establishes the 
right, for Avhich the memorialists contend. 

The creation of a New State is, in effect, a compact between 
Congress and the inhabitants of the proposed State. Con- 
gress would not probably claim the power of compelling the 
inhabitants of Missouri to form a constitution of .their own, 
and come into the Union as a State. It is as plain, that the 
inhabitants of that Territory have no right to admission into 
the Union, as a State, without the consent of Congress. Nei- 
ther party is bound to form this connexion. It can be form- 
ed only by the consent of both. What, then, prevents Con- 
gress, as one of the stipulating parties, to propose its terms ? 



And if the other party assents to these terms, why do they not 
effectually bind both parties ? Or if the inhabitants of the Ter- 
ritory do not choose to accept the proposed terms, but prefer 
to remain under a Territorial government, has Congress de- 
prived them of any right, or subjected them to any restraint, 
which, in its discretion, it had not authority to do ? If the ad- 
mission of New States be not the discretionary exercise of a 
Constitutional power, but, in all cases, an imperative duty, 
how is it to be performed? If the Constitution means that 
Congress shall admit New States, does it mean that Congress 
shall do this on every application, and under all circumstan- 
ces ? Or if this construction cannot be admitted, and if it must 
be conceded that Congress must, in some respects, exercise 
its discretion, on the admission of New States, how is it to be 
shewn, that that discretion may not be exercised, in regard to 
this subject, as well as in regard to others? 

The Constitution declares, " that the migration or importa- 
" tion of such persons as any of the States, nmo existing, shall 
" think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Con- 
" gress, prior to the year 1008." It is most manifest that the 
Constitution does contemplate, in the very terms of this clause, 
that Congress possess the authority to prohibit the migration 
or importation of Slaves ; for it limits the exercise of this 
authority for a speciiic period of time, leaving it to its full 
operation ever afterwards. And this power seems necessari- 
ly included in the authority, which belongs to Congress, " to 
" regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the seve- 
" ral States." No person has ever doubted that the prohibition 
of the foreign Slave Trade was completely within the author- 
ity of Congress, since the year 1 808. And why ? Certainly, 
only because it is embraced in the regulation of foreign com- 
merce : and if so, it may for the like reason be prohibited, 
since that period, between the States. Commerce in Slaves, 
since the year 1 808, being as much subject to the regulation 
of Congress as any other commerce, if it should see fit to en- 
act that no Slave should ever be sold from one State to ano- 
2 



JO 

ther, it is not perceived how its Constitutional right to make 
such provision could be questioned. It would seem to be too 
plain to be questioned, that Congress did possess the power, 
before the year 1808, to prohibit the migration or importation 
of Slaves into its Territories, (and in point of fact it exercised 
that power) as well as into any Mew States ; and that its au- 
thority, after that year, might be as fully exercised to pre- 
vent the migration or importation of Slaves into any of the 
Old States. And if it may prohibit New States from importing 
Slaves, it may surely, as we humbly submit, make it a condi- 
tion of the admission of such States into the Union, that they 
shall never import them. In relation, too, to its own Territo- 
ries, Congress possess a more extensive authority, and may, 
in various other ways, effect the same object. It might, for 
example, make it an express condition of its grants of the soil, 
that the owners shall never hold Slaves ; and thus prevent the 
possession of Slaves from ever being connected with the own- 
ership of the soil. 

As corroborative of the views, which have been already 
suggested, the memorialists would respectfully call the atten- 
tion of Congress to the history of the national legislation, 
under the confederation as well as under the present Con- 
stitution, on this interesting subject. Unless the memorial- 
ists greatly mistake, it will demonstrate the sense of the na- 
tion at every period of its legislation to have been, that the 
prohibition of Slavery was no infringement of any just rights 
belonging to free States, and was not incompatible with the 
enjoyment of all the rights and immunities, which an admis- 
sion into the Union was supposed to confer. 

It will be recollected that Congress, by a Resolve of the 
10th of October, 1780, declared that the unappropriated lands 
that might be ceded to the United States, pursuant to a pre- 
vious recommendation of Congress, should be disposed of 
for the common benefit of the United States, and be settled 
and formed into distinct republican States, which should be- 
come members of the federal Union and have the same 



11 

rights of sovereignty, freedom and independence, as the other 
States. This language is exceedingly strong, and guaranties 
to the New States the same rights of sovereignty as the Old 
States possessed. It was undoubtedly with this Resolve in 
view, that the Territory northwest of the Ohio was ultimate- 
ly ceded to the United States by the several States claiming 
title to it ; viz. by Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, and 
Virginia. New York made a cession on the first of March, 
1781, without annexing any condition ; Virginia, on the first 
of March, 1784, upon certain conditions ; and, among others, 
a condition embracing the substance of the Resolve of the 
10th of October, 1 780. Massachusetts made a cession on the 
19th of April, 1785, stating no conditions, but expressly to the 
uses stated in the Resolve of 1780. And lastly Connecticut 
made a cession on the 13th of September, 1786, without any 
condition, but expressly for the common use and benefit of 
the United States. On the 13th of July, 1787, Congress pass- 
ed an Ordinance for the government of the Territory so add- 
ed, which has ever since continued in force, and has formed 
the basis of the Territorial governments of the United States. 
This Ordinance was passed by the unanimous voice of all the 
States present at its passage ; viz. Massachusetts, New York, 
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, and Georgia. It contains six fundamental articles 
as a compact between the United States and the inhabitants, 
who might occupy that Territory, which are introduced by 
a preamble, declaring them to be " for extending the funda- 
" mental principles of civil and religious liberty, which form 
" the basis whereon these republics, their laws and constitu- 
" tions, are created ; to fix and establish those principles as 
" the basis of all laws, constitutions and governments, which 
" forever hereafter shall be formed in said Territory ; to pro- 
" vide also for the establishment of States and a government 
" therein, and for their admission into a share in the federal 
u councils, on an equal footing with the original Slates, at as 
" early a period as might be consistent with the general intc . 



12 

'•' rest." The 6th article declares, that " there shall neither 
" be Slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said Territory, 
" otherwise than for the punishment of crimes, whereof the 
" party shall become convicted." It is observable, that no 
objection occurred to this article, on the ground that it was 
incompatible with the equal sovereignty, freedom and inde- 
pendence with the original States, to which the New States, 
to be formed in the ceded Territory, were entitled, by the 
Resolve of the 10th of October, 1780, and by the express 
reference to that Resolve, in the conditions of some of the 
cessions. It is observable, also, that by the preamble alrea- 
dy recited, to which all the States present acceded, and among 
these were three of the ceding States, and a majority of the 
Slave-holding States, it was expressly admitted, that the re- 
strictions of the 6th article would not deprive the New States, 
upon their admission into the federal councils, of their equal 
footing with the original States. This is a high, legislative con- 
struction, by independent States, acting in their sovereign ca- 
pacity, and entitled to the greater weight, because it was a sub- 
ject of common interest; and to all it could not but be deem- 
ed a precedent, which would justly influence the subsequent 
measures of the general government. Since the adoption of 
the Constitution, three New States, forming a part of this Ter- 
ritory, viz. Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois have been admitted 
into the Union. In the acts enabling them to form State go- 
vernments and a State constitution, Congress has, among 
other very important conditions, made it a fundamental con- 
dition, that their constitutions should contain nothing repug- 
nant to the Ordinance of 1787. These conditions were ac- 
ceded to by these States, and have ever been deemed obliga- 
tory upon them and inviolable; and these States, notwith- 
standing those conditions, are universally considered as ad- 
mitted into the Union upon the same footing as the original 
States, and as possessing, in respect to the Union, the same 
rights of sovereignty, freedom, and independence as the other 
States, in the sense, in which those terms are used in the Re- 



13 

solve of 1 730. During a period of thirty years, not a doubt 
has been suggested, that the provisions of this Ordinance were 
perfectly compatible with the implied and express conditions 
of the cessions of this Territory ; and that Congress might 
justly impose the conditions, which it contains, upon all the 
States formed within its limits. 

In the year 1791, Vermont was admitted into the Union, 
without any condition being annexed respecting Slavery. 
The reason was obvious. It had already formed a constitu- 
tion, which excluded Slavery ; and it may be also asserted, 
that, looking to the habits and feelings of its population, and 
the habits and feelings, and constitutional provisions of neigh- 
bouring States, it was morally impossible that Slavery could 
be adopted in that State. 

Kentucky was admitted into the Union in June, 1792. The 
State was formed from the State of Virginia, and the latter, in 
granting its consent, imposed certain conditions, which have 
since been supposed to form a fundamental compact, which 
neither is at liberty to violate. Congress did not impose 
any restrictions as to Slavery on its admission, and for rea- 
sons, which cannot escape the most careless observer. It 
would have been manifestly unjust, as well as impolitic. 

Tennessee was admitted into the Union in June, 1796. It 
was ceded by North Carolina, more than six years before, as 
a Territory, upon certain conditions, and among them, that 
Congress should assume the government of the Territory, 
and govern it according to the Ordinance of 1787; with a 
proviso, however, " that no regulation made or to be made 
" by Congress shall tend to emancipate Slaves." In good 
faith, therefore, Congress could not justly insist upon a pro- 
hibition of Slavery upon its admission into the Union. 

Mississippi was admitted into the Union in December, 
1817, upon condition that its constitution should contain 
nothing repugnant to the Ordinance of 1787, so far as the 
same had been extended to the Territory by the agreement 
of cession made between the United States and Georgia ; and 



14 

Alabama was authorized to become a State by the act of 
2d of March, 1819, upon a similar condition. Both of these 
States were ceded as one Territory to the United States by 
Georgia, in April, 1 802, upon condition, among other things, 
that it should be admitted into the Union in the same manner 
as the Territory northwest of the Ohio might be under the 
Ordinance of 1787; " which Ordinance (it is declared) shall 
" extend to the Territory contained in the present act of ces- 
" sion, that article only excepted, which forbids Slavery." The 
prohibition of Slavery could not, therefore, without the gross- 
est breach of faith, be applied to this Territory. And the 
very circumstance of this exception in this cession of Geor- 
gia, as well as in that of North Carolina, shews strongly the 
sense of those States that, without such an exception, Con- 
gress would possess the authority in question. 

The memorialists, after this general survey, would respect- 
fully ask the attention of Congress to the state of the question 
of the right of Congress to prohibit Slavery in that part of 
the former Territory of Louisiana, which now forms the Mis- 
souri Territory. Louisiana was purchased of France by the 
Treaty of the 30th of April, 1 803. The third article of that 
Treaty is as follows : " The inhabitants of the ceded Terri- 
" tory shall be incorporated into the Union of the United 
" States, and admitted as soon as possible, according to the 
" principles of the federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of all 
" the rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the United 
" States ; and in the mean time they shall be maintained and 
" protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, 
" and the religion, which they profess." 

Although the language of this article is not very precise 
or accurate, the memorialists conceive that its real import 
and intent cannot be mistaken. The first clause provides 
for the admission of the ceded Territory into the Union, and 
the succeeding clause shews this must be according to the 
principles of the federal Constitution; and this very qualifica- 
tion necessarily excludes the idea that Congress were not to 



15 

be at liberty to impose any conditions upon such admission, 
which were consistent with the principles of that Constitu* 
tion, and w'lich had been or might justly be applied to other 

New States. The language; is not by any means so point) d 
as that of tie Resolve of 1780: and yet it has been seen 
that that Resolve was never supposed to inhibit the authori- 
ty of Congress, as to the introduction of Slavery. And it is 
clear, upon the plainest rules of construction, that in the ab- 
sence of all restrictive language, a clause, merely providing 
for the admission of a Territory into the Union, must be 
construed to authorize an admission in the manner, and upon 
the terms, which the Constitution itself would justify. This 
construction derives additional support from the next clause. 
The inhabitants " shall be admitted as soon as possible, ac- 
" cording to the principles of the federal Constitution, to the 
" enjoyment of all the rights, advantages and immunities of citi- 
" zens of the United States." The rights, advantages and immu- 
nities here spoken of must, from the very force of the terms 
of the clause, be such as are recognized or communicated by 
the Constitution of the United States ; such as arc common 
to all citizens, and are uniform throughout the United States. 
The clause cannot, be referred to rights, advantages and im- 
munities, derived exclusively from the State governments, 
for these do not depend upon the federal Constitution. Be- 
sides, it would be impossible that all the rights, advantages 
and immunities of citizens of the different States could be 
at the same time enjoyed by the same persons. These 
rights are different in different States ; a right exists in one 
State, which is denied in others, or is repugnant to other 
rights enjoyed in others. In some of the States, a freeholder 
alone is entitled to vote in elections ; in some, a qualification 
of personal property is sufficient; and in others, age and 
freedom are the sole qualifications of electors. In some 
States, no citizen is permitted to hold Slaves ; in others, he 
possesses that power absolutely ; in others, it is limited. The 
obvious meaning therefore of the clause is, that the rights 



16 

derived under the federal Constitution shall be enjoyed by 
the inhabitants of Louisiana in the same manner as by the 
citizens of other States. The United States, by the Con- 
stitution, are bound to guarantee to every State in the Union 
a republican form of government; and the ii. 'habitants of 
Louisiana are entitled, when a State, to this guarantee. Each 
State has a right to two senators, and to representatives ac- 
cording to a certain enumeration of population pointed out 
in the Constitution. The inhabitants of Louisiana, upon 
their admission into the Union, are also entitled to these privi- 
leges. The Constitution further declares, " that the citizens 
" of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and im- 
" munities of citizens in the several States." It would seem 
as if the meaning of this clause could not well be misinter- 
preted. It obviously applies to the case of the removal of 
a citizen of one State to another State ; and in such a case 
it secures to the migrating citizen all the privileges and im- 
munities of citizens in the State to which he removes. It 
cannot surely be contended, upon any rational interpreta- 
tion, that it gives to the citizens of each State all the privi- 
leges and immunities of the citizens of every other State, at 
the same time and under all circumstances. Such a construc- 
tion would lead to the most extraordinary consequences. It 
would at once destroy all the fundamental limitations of the 
State constitutions upon the rights of their own citizens ; and 
leave all those rights at the mercy of the citizens of any other 
State, which should adopt different limitations. According to 
this construction, if all the State constitutions, save one, pro- 
hibited Slavery, it would be in the power of that single State, 
by the admission of the right of its citizens to hold Slaves, 
to communicate the same right to the citizens of all the oth- 
er States within their own exclusive limits, in defiance of 
their own constitutional prohibitions ; and to render the ab- 
surdity still more apparent, the same construction would 
communicate the most opposite and irreconcilable rights to 
the citizens of different States at the same time. It seems 



17 

therefore to be undeniable, upon any rational interpretation, 
that this clause of the Constitution communicated no rights 
in any State, which its own citizens do not enjoy ; and that 
the citizens of Louisiana, upon their admission into the 
Union, in receiving the benefit of this clause, would not en- 
joy higher, or more extensive rights than the citizens of Ohio. 
It would communicate to the former no right of holding 
Slaves, except in States, where the citizens already possess- 
ed the same right under their own State constitutions and 
laws. 

The Treaty, then, by providing for the inhabitants of 
Louisiana the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages and 
immunities of citizens of the United States, seems distinctly 
to have pointed to those derived from the federal Constitu- 
tion, and not to those, which, being derived from other sour- 
ces, were enjoyed by some and denied to others of the citi- 
zens of the United States. 

The remaining clause of the Treaty, " that in the mean 
" time" the inhabitants " shall be maintained and protected 
" in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and the 
" religion, which they profess," requires no examination. It 
manifestly applies to the period of its Territorial govern- 
ment ; and has no reference to the terms of its admission into 
the Union, or to the condition of the Territory after it be- 
comes a State. But it may be confidently asked whether, if 
the whole Ordinance of 1787, which contains the prohibition 
of Slavery, had been extended to Louisiana, there would 
have been any thing inconsistent with the enjoyment of liber- 
ty, property or religion ? So far as Slaves are deemed pro- 
perty, it might be just that the then real owners within the 
Territory should be secured in the enjoyment of that pro- 
perty ; but the permission to acquire such property in future, 
like every other right of property, ought to depend upon 
sound legislation, and be granted or denied by Congress, as 
its own judgment should direct. And the memorialists can- 



18 

not perceive, in this clause of the Treaty, any restriction upon 
the right of Congress to exercise the utmost freedom of legis- 
lation as to the future introduction of Slaves into the ceded 
Territory. 

Congress, after this cession, divided the Territory into two 
Territorial governments ; and by an act passed on the 2d of 
March, 1805, in the exercise of its legislative discretion, di- 
rected that the Orleans Territory (which has since become 
the State of Louisiana,) should be governed by the Ordinance 
of 1787, excepting as to the descent and distribution of es- 
tates, and the article respecting Slavery. By a subsequent 
act of the 11th of April, 1811, authorizing the inhabitants of 
this Territory to become a State, Congress annexed several 
highly important conditions to the exercise of this high act of 
sovereignty. Among other conditions, it required that the 
River Mississippi, and the waters thereof, should be high- 
ways, and remain forever free to all the inhabitants of the 
United States and its Territories, without any tax, toll or im- 
post laid by the State therefor ; that the constitution should 
contain the fundamental principles of civil and religious lib- 
erty, and should allow the trial by jury in criminal cases, 
and the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus ; that all the 
laws, records and judicial proceedings of the State, judicial 
and legislative, should be in the language, in which the laws 
of the United States are written ; that the people should dis- 
claim all right to the unappropriated Territory, within the 
limits of the State, and that the same should be at the dispo- 
sal of the United States ; that lands sold by the United States 
should be exempt from taxation for five years from the sale ; 
and that lands of non-residents should not be taxed higher 
than those of residents. These conditions are certainly very 
striking limitations of sovereignty, and embrace most of the 
fundamental regulations of the Ordinance of 1787, excepting 
the article touching Slavery. It is not known to the memori- 
alists that any doubt of their constitutionality, or of their per- 



19 

feet harmony with the Treaty of 1 803, was ever entertained, 
either in Congress or in Louisiana ; and yet they contained 
some principles as repugnant to the original jurisprudence of 
the Territory, at the time of its cession, as could well be de- 
vised ; and if Congress could then impose such conditions, 
what reason is there to say, that it may not now impose the 
same conditions on the Missouri Territory? and if such con- 
ditions, why not any others, which its wisdom, its justice or 
its policy may dictate ? 

Upon the whole, the memorialists would most respectfully 
submit, that the terms of the Constitution, as well as the prac- 
tice of the governments under it, must, as they humbly con- 
ceive, entirely justify the conclusion, that Congress may pro- 
hibit the further introduction of Slavery into its own Territo- 
ries, and also make such prohibition a condition of the ad- 
mission of any New State into the Union. 

If the Constitutional power of Congress to make the propos- 
ed prohibition be satisfactorily shewn, the justice and policy 
of such prohibition seem to the undersigned to be supported 
by plain and strong reasons. The permission of Slavery in 
a New State necessarily draws after it an extension of that 
inequality of representation, which already exists in regard to 
the original States. It cannot be expected, that those of the 
original States, which do not hold Slaves, can look on such an 
extension as being politically just. As between the original 
States, the representation rests on compact and plighted faith ; 
and your memorialists have no wish, that that compact should 
be disturbed, or that plighted faith in the slightest degree vio- 
lated. But the subject assumes an entirely different charac- 
ter, when a New State proposes to be admitted. With her 
there is no compact, and no faith plighted ; and where is the 
reason, that she should come into the Union with more than 
an equal share of political importance and political power ? 
Already the ratio of representation, established by the Con- 
stitution, has given to the States holding Slaves twenty mera- 



20 

bers in the House of Representatives more than they would 
have been entitled to, except under the particular provision 
of the Constitution. In all probability, this number will be 
doubled in thirty years. Under these circumstances, we 
deem it not an unreasonable expectation, that the inhabitants 
of Missouri should propose to come into the Union, renounc- 
ing the right in question, and establishing a constitution, pro- 
hibiting it for ever. Without dwelling on this topic, we have 
still thought it our duty to present it to the consideration of 
Congress. We present it with a deep and earnest feeling of 
its importance, and we respectfully solicit for it the full con- 
sideration of the National Legislature. 

Your memorialists were not without the hope, that the time 
had at length arrived, when the inconvenience and the danger 
of this description of population had become apparent, in all 
parts of this country, and in all parts of the civilized world. 
It might have been hoped that the New States themselves 
would have had such a view of their own permanent interests 
and prosperity, as would have led them to prohibit its exten- 
sion and increase. The wonderful increase and prosperity 
of the States north of the Ohio is unquestionably to be as- 
cribed in a great measure to the consequences of the Ordi- 
nance of 1787; and fe\v y indeed, are the occasions, in the 
history of nations, in which so much can be done, by a sin- 
gle act, for the benefit of future generations, as was done by 
that Ordinance, and as may now be done by the Congress of 
the United States. We appeal to the justice and the wisdom 
of the National Councils to prevent the further progress of a 
great and serious evil : We appeal to those, who look for- 
ward to the remote consequences of their measures, and who 
cannot balance a temporary or trilling convenience, if there 
were such, against a permanent, growing, and desolating evil. 

We cannot forbear to remind the two Houses of Congress, 
that the early and decisive measures adopted by the Ameri- 
can Government for the abolition of the Slave Trade are 



21 

among the proudest memorials of our nation's glory. That 
Slavery was ever tolerated in the Republic is, as yet, to be 
attributed to the policy of another government. No imputa- 
tion, thus far, rests on any portion of the American Confede- 
racy. The Missouri Territory is a new country. If its ex- 
tensive and fertile fields shall be opened as a market for 
Slaves, the Government will seem to become a party to a 
traffic which, in so many acts, through so many years, it has 
denounced as impolitic, unchristian, inhuman. To enact laws 
to punish the traffic, and at the same time to tempt cupidity 
and avarice by the allurements of an insatiable market, is 
inconsistent and irreconcilable. Government, by such a 
course, would only defeat its own purposes, and render nu- 
gatory its own measures. Nor can the laws derive support 
from the manners of the people, if the power of moral senti- 
ment be weakened, by enjoying, under the permission of 
Government, great facilities to commit offences. The laws 
of the United States have denounced heavy penalties against 
the traffic in Slaves, because such traffic is deemed unjust 
and inhuman. We appeal to the spirit of these laws : We 
appeal to this justice and humanity : We ask whether they 
ought not to operate, on the present occasion, with all their 
force ? We have a strong feeling of the injustice of any 
toleration of Slavery. Circumstances have entailed it on a 
portion of our community, which cannot be immediately re- 
lieved from it, without consequences more injurious than the 
suffering of the evil. But to permit it in a new country, 
where yet no habits are formed, which render it indis- 
pensable, what is it, but to encourage that rapacity, and 
fraud and violence, against which we have so long pointed 
the denunciations of our penal code ? What is it, but to 
tarnish the proud fame of the country ? What is it, but to 
throw suspicion on its good faith, and to render questionable 
all its professions of regard for the rights of humanity and 
the liberties of mankind ? 



22 

As inhabitants of a free country ; as citizens of a great and 
rising Republic ; as members of a Christian community ; as 
living in a liberal and enlightened age, and as feeling our- 
selves called upon by the dictates of religion and humanity ; 
we have presumed to offer our sentiments to Congress on 
this question, with a solicitude for the event, far beyond 
what a common occasion could inspire. 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



011 932 561 4 * 



